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dc.contributor.authorLupsha, Peter A.
dc.contributor.authorSchlegel, Kip
dc.date.accessioned2009-07-30T18:04:17Z
dc.date.available2009-07-30T18:04:17Z
dc.date.issued1980-11
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/1928/9720
dc.description.abstractIn this paper we examine the effects of this drug trafficking contrabandista activity, the rise and decline of Mexico's leadership as an exporter of illicit drugs, and some of the effects of organized trafficking on the political economy of both Mexico and the United States. Smuggling and contraband are endemic to borderlands. As one knowledgeable observer estimated, "anywhere from 20 percent to 30 percent of all economic activity along our Southwestern border is illegal contraband.,2 Of this contraband trade only a small percentage involves the smuggling of illegal drugs. Most of it involves the illegal rebalancing of border-created supply-and demand inefficiencies. Coffee, instant cocoa, parrots, vehicles, appliances, human labor , mercury, guns, or drugs make up the traffic, and whatever is expensive in one nation and cheap in another provide the incentive to the contrabandista. Like many kinds of crime and criminal activity, smuggling is functional and helps satisfy larger systemic needs.en_US
dc.language.isoenen_US
dc.publisherLatin American and Iberian Instituteen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriesLAII Research Paper Seriesen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriesNo. 2en_US
dc.subjectPolitical, Economy, Drug Trafficking, Mexico, United States, Herrera, Contrabandistaen_US
dc.titleThe Political Economy of Drug Trafficking: The Herrera Organization (Mexico and the United States)en_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US


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