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dc.contributor.authorBay, Norman
dc.date.accessioned2008-10-20T17:29:34Z
dc.date.available2008-10-20T17:29:34Z
dc.date.issued2005
dc.identifier.citation83 Denv. U. L. Rev. 335 (2005)en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/1928/6962
dc.description.abstractTwo important paradigm shifts have occurred in the war on terror. First, the United States has treated terrorism as a military issue, not a law enforcement problem. Second, the United States has centralized its intelligence apparatus under the direction of the newly-created Director of National Intelligence and lowered the wall that separated external security or foreign intelligence activity from internal security or domestic law enforcement. In tandem, these changes are of historic dimension. They also occur against a backdrop in modern times in which the executive branch has steadily accumulated power. In pursuit of the war on terror, we have begun to blur traditional lines meant to protect civil liberty from the danger of excessive executive power: the line between the military and domestic law enforcement on the one hand, and between domestic law enforcement and foreign intelligence on the other. This blurring of the lines already has led to difficult questions regarding the limits of executive prerogative and will undoubtedly lead to more. The cumulative effect of both paradigm shifts is to enlarge executive authority and to increase the risk of civil liberty abuses.en_US
dc.language.isoen_USen_US
dc.publisherDenver University Law Reviewen_US
dc.titleExecutive Power and the War on Terroren_US
dc.typeArticleen_US


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